Wednesday, January 18, 2023 – I am a current employee of the IEBC and in that capacity, I was central to the administration of the 2022 elections. I have taken this extraordinary step — knowing full well the risks to me, my family, and colleagues — to provide the authentic and incontrovertible data on the 2022 Kenyan elections.
That original data, which the public has never seen until now, shows without an iota of doubt that the IEBC under Chairman Wafula Chebukati, Commissioners Abdi Guliye and Boya Molu together with CEO Marjan Hussein provided falsified data and results to the Kenyan people. I can think of no crime bigger than this.
The voice of the people is the voice of God and it must never be abrogated by anyone within the state. I have chosen to reveal what I know because I could never live with myself if I did not do the right thing. I am a Kenyan and my conscience is to the sovereignty of the people of Kenya.
Let it never be said that when it counted the most, I cowered and failed to stand up for the truth and our country. I have done my patriotic duty so that future generations will not have to endure the national shame and tragedy of stolen elections. I speak because I want this nation to go through a catharsis, a reckoning with history so that our future may allow us to join the community of global democracies.
The bottom line is that there will be no reason for any Kenyan to participate as a voter or candidate in future elections if the fraud of the 2022 elections is not reversed. Going forward, I plead with Kenyans to exercise their full democratic rights within the four corners of the constitution to vindicate our elections.
Fellow Kenyans, a total of 264 out of the expected 290 Forms 34B were received at the IEBC data transmission centre. These forms were received in JPEG (image) format at the “back office” – the backend of the IEBC portal that was meant to be only accessible to IEBC ICT administrators and not the general public.
At the ‘back office’ of the IEBC data transmission centre, illegal entities were created to change forms 34B from its original jpeg form to pdf (portable document format). This is questionable as the KIEMS kits that were used to transmit the forms from the polling centres did not have the capacity to change any file from its original jpeg form to any other form.
The audit shows that remote access or full access was given to non- authorised users who were able to change jpeg Forms 34B to word or other file editors then converted back to png/pdf which was later uploaded to the public portal.
The aforementioned process goes contrary to the electoral procedures in which each KIEMS kit was designed and serialized to transmit files from point A (POLLING STATION) to point C (National Tallying Centre) without interception. Being that each KIEMS kit was registered to a certain polling station implies that they shouldn’t transmit for other foreign polling stations.
For example, KIEMS kit number 32A cannot transmit results for KIEMS kit number 80D etc. It was also noted that Forms 34A of Books 2 were largely used whenever form 34A of book 1 were depleted (used up) at the polling stations. Since each book was serialised and watermarked, the scheme used thereafter was to change original Forms 34A of Book 1 to PNG in order to alter background watermarks.
To explain this, the forms recovered contain details on how figures were altered, swapped and deleted from Candidate A (Raila Odinga in this case) in favour of Candidate B (William Ruto). By design, the digital registry at the back-office should contain details of whoever provided unauthorised access to third parties. It also logs the details of the third parties who were granted access and how many computers were in use. When reviewed, it should provide details of how many forms were received in jpeg form from polling stations, as well as the percentage of the voter turnout. It also shows how, when and what time the forms were sent from polling stations and what time the forms in their original state were received at the back office.
It is important to note that at the back office, there is only one Administrator. This administrator, therefore, is the one responsible for all password matrix information as well as all changes done to files received. The password matrix of the system can only be recreated to several entities by this administrator. It should also be noted that each and every form 34A transmitted from the polling station comes with its own metadata i.e. information on the time the photo was taken, the time it was sent, the time it was received, the image size in pixels, the source location and the exif (each KIEMS kit uses Exif annotations).
The standard format for storing interchange information in digital photography files using jpeg is Exif (exchangeable image file). KIEMS kits are equipped with digital cameras which use Exif for storing information of the image captured such as shutter speed, exposure compensation, metering system used, if a flash was used to capture the image, white balance, date and time the image was taken, location, auxiliary lenses and resolution.
I would like to report that the Form 34B result forms for 46 constituencies were never transmitted between 9th and 27th of August 2022. The result forms available have no metadata to confirm where they came from. At the same time, a total of 3,986 forms 34A were never received at the National Tally Centre between August 9th and 29th August 2022.
Some constituencies transmitted more than two result forms with different figures (this is where Forms 34A of Book 2 were used). The comparison between the two images will confirm exactly what happened at the IEBC back office.
Finally, there is evidence that more than 1,000 unregistered users (users whose ID cannot be confirmed) sent result forms from IP addresses outside the borders of Kenya.
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